Commentary

Lawfare Today:
A Perspective

By Major General Charl e s J . Du n l a p, J r. , U S A F
Lawfare is a concept that is ever more frequently discussed in government,
academic, and media circles. Regrettably, that discussion is not as informed
as it might be. The purpose of this commentary is to clarify what lawfare
means by discussing how it originated, how it is being used by opposing
sides in modern conflicts, and what some of the challenges are as we look
ahead. Although I’ve tinkered with the definition over the years, I now
define “lawfare” as the strategy of using – or misusing – law as a substitute
for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.1 As such,
I view law in this context much the same as a weapon. It is a means that can
be used for good or bad purposes.
I started using “lawfare” in speeches and writings2 beginning in the late 1990s
because I wanted a “bumper sticker” term easily understood by a variety
of audiences to describe how law was altering warfare. At that point, I had
the hubris to think I invented the term; actually, it had been used a couple of
times previously in a completely different context starting in the mid-1970s.3
I needed something to describe what I and others saw as a new relationship
between law and war. General James L. Jones, then the commander of NATO,
famously observed in a Parade magazine article:
It used to be a simple thing to fight a battle…In a perfect world, a general
would get up and say, “Follow me, men,” and everybody would say,
“Aye, sir” and run off. But that’s not the world anymore, …[now] you
have to have a lawyer or a dozen. It’s become very legalistic and very
complex.4
The reasons for this phenomenon are several, but I think they are largely
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traceable to the growing importance of international law generally, a growth
itself tied, in my judgment, to globalization. Today’s international commerce
requires an extensive legal architecture to function, and this fact operates to
raise the “legal consciousness”, so to speak, of the entire world community.5
As we have seen before,6 such trends in global affairs tend to spill over into
warfare.
Lawfare can operate as a positive “good.” Ideally, substituting lawfare
methodologies for traditional military means can reduce the destructiveness of war, if not its frequency. An illustration: prior to starting our military operations in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, military planners were
concerned about the ready availability of high-resolution, near real-time
commercial satellite imagery of the operational area – information of very
obvious military value to our adversaries. One can imagine any number of
orthodox military approaches that might have been used to stop such data
from reaching enemy hands. Instead, a legal “weapon”, that is, a contract,
was launched to achieve the same effect. Specifically, exclusive rights to all
the imagery were purchased, thus denying it to potential opponents.7 In
this respect lawfare is an excellent example of what military strategists call
effects-based8 operations where the effect created is the focus, not necessarily
the means of obtaining it.
Law-oriented, effects-based operations have become a critical piece of our
counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. Specifically, General David Petraeus,
the U.S. commander in Iraq,9 established a Rule of Law Complex in Baghdad, an innovation the New York Times called an “important element of the
American campaign plan.”10 The Complex is a fortified “Green Zone” for
legal infrastructure designed, the Washington Times reports, to “bring police,
judicial/jail functions to a secure environment.”11 This self-contained haven
permits Iraqis to solve Iraqi problems in relative safety for themselves and
their families. Supporting this effort is the Law and Order Task Force, staffed
by judge advocates (JAGs) from all the services. After completing a tour
of reserve duty with the Task Force last summer, Colonel Lindsey Graham
– who is, incidentally, a U.S. senator – observes that building a fair legal
system that holds all segments of the population accountable is “[o]ne way
to kill the insurgency beyond [using] military force.”12
Other aspects of lawfare are more complicated. As Yale Law School Professor
Michael Riesman and Yale Law School alumnus Chris T. Antoniou explained
in their 1994 book, The Laws of War:
In modern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires
a substantial base of public support. That support can erode or even
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reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy the political objective, if
people believe that the war is being conducted in an unfair, inhumane,
or iniquitous way.13
Of course, belligerents have long sought to use the perception or fact of
wrongdoing by their opponents as a means of catalyzing support among their
own people, and eroding it among their foes. Modern information technologies have, however, vastly increased the scope, velocity, and effectiveness of
such efforts. For example, recriminations about civilian casualties – often
illustrated by horrific images – instantly fill the broadcasts of the 24-hour
global news services, and rapidly appear on thousands of websites and in
the blogosphere. Adversaries waging this form of lawfare see our adherence
to law as something to exploit. Professor William Eckhart, well-known for
having prosecuted the My Lai cases during his JAG service, observes that:
Knowing that our society so respects the rule of law that it demands
compliance with it, our enemies carefully attack our military plans as
illegal and immoral and our execution of those plans as contrary to the
law of war. Our vulnerability here is what philosopher of war Carl von
Clausewitz would term our ‘center of gravity.’14
It is a mistake, however, to reduce “lawfare” to a mere component of a glorified propaganda campaign. In truth, it is a richer and far more complex
concept – and one, lamentably, subject to misunderstanding.
Among other things, concern from the public, NGOs, academics, legislatures, and the courts about the behavior of militaries is more than simply a
public relations problem; it is a legitimate and serious activity that is totally
consistent with adherence to the rule of law, democratic values, and – for
that matter - lawfare. Accordingly, I disagree with Mr. Scott Horton when he
charged in the July 2007 issue of Harper’s Magazine that “lawfare theorists”
– and I guess I’m one of them - reason that lawyers who present war-related
claims in court “might as well be terrorists themselves.”15 That is absurd.
He apparently wants to endow lawfare with a kind of intrinsic evilness that
it simply does not and cannot possess. As I say, lawfare is much like a tool
or weapon that can be used properly in accordance with the higher virtues
of the rule of law – or not. It all depends on who is wielding it, how they
do it, and why.
To be clear, I condemn any interpretation of lawfare which would cast terrorists as those legitimately using the courts to challenge any governmental
action. As a matter of fact, the use of the courts is something I advocate as a
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vitally important lawfare measure. Why? Courts can help suppress criminal
behavior which, especially in today’s environment, operates to create effects
indistinguishable from conventional battlefield defeats. It is no surprise
that Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, then the senior American commander in
Iraq, used customary military terminology in saying that Abu Ghraib was
“clearly a defeat.”16 Thus, wholly apart from abstract notions of justice, there
are pragmatic, purely military reasons for using the courts. Commanders are
keenly aware that if behavior like that at Abu Ghraib is allowed to flourish,
the military task becomes vastly more difficult, and requires significantly
more reliance upon costly military force.
Obviously, judicial action can help deter such damaging misconduct from
occurring in the future. However, the legitimacy of the process requires the
zealous efforts of all, including defense counsel. Recourse to the courts is
a facet of lawfare to be encouraged, not discouraged. Of course, there are
nefarious uses of lawfare. These would include those who would manipulate respect for the law to achieve a military advantage. An illustration is
the frequency with which insurgents use mosques as armories, assembly
points for fighters, and command and control centers. They are trying to
take advantage of the protections normally accorded religious sites under the
law of armed conflict.17 Even more despicable, our adversaries commonly
hide among noncombatants in order to shield themselves from attack or, if
attacked, propagandize any civilian losses that may occur. Unfortunately,
this can drive the militaries of democracies to take well-meaning but ill-considered steps that ultimately play into enemy hands.
Consider how reports about NATO airstrikes allegedly causing civilian casualties were handled by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
in Afghanistan. As I wrote in a Washington Times op-ed last August,18 ISAF
responded to queries about a report of such deaths by proclaiming that
“NATO would not fire on positions if it knew there were civilians nearby.”19
Sadly, such rules encourage the enemies to do exactly what we do not want
them to do. That is, they surround themselves with innocents so as to immunize themselves almost entirely from attack.
As these examples show, lawfare – in both positive and negative forms - is
now a fact of modern war. A recent web search of the term produced over
51,000 “hits” – a stupendous increase from the handful in 2001. The rise of
lawfare has stimulated something of a “revolution in military legal affairs”20
that has made JAGs an indispensable part of a commander’s warfighting
team. Because JAGs are members of the brotherhood of arms, commanders
are naturally comfortable with them. Moreover, the military training JAGs
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receive helps them understand the weapons, strategies, and command and
control processes of modern war.
Knowing the military client’s “business,” so to speak, is essential for lawfare
practitioners. Candidly, I find that many of our civilian colleagues, especially
in academia, just do not know enough about today’s high-tech military to be
as expert as they might want to be. More than specialized technical expertise
shapes the JAGs approach to legal issues. A fascinating essay by Professor
Richard Schragger of the University of the Virginia Law School contrasts JAG
conceptions from those of other government attorneys. He notes that:
Military lawyers seem to conceive of the rule of law differently [than
civilian government lawyers]. Instead of seeing law as a barrier to the
exercise of the client’s power, these attorneys understand the law as a
prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of power…Law makes just wars
possible by creating a well-defined legal space within which individual
soldiers can act without resorting to their own personal moral codes.21
Not everyone, however, appreciates the new role of uniformed lawyers in
contemporary lawfare-intense conflicts. I’d like to take a few minutes to discuss this criticism because I believe it is a crucial issue not just in the context
of lawfare, but for national security law in general.
Consider the article that Professor John Yoo co-authored in the August issue
of the UCLA Law Review. Yoo, I am sure you recall, was involved in some of
the most troubling national security law legal opinions in recent years. Jack
Goldsmith’s recent book discusses several of them. 22 In his article Professor
Yoo attacks military lawyers as being much responsible for what he considers
a “breakdown” in civil-military relations.23 Professor Yoo’s motivation for
lashing out at JAGs is not difficult to discern: as Charlie Savage’s new book
reports, 24 JAGs opposed, with some success, several of the legal propositions
Yoo touted when he worked in government.
Professor Yoo contends that the JAG legal opinions amounted to no more
than simply “policy preferences” that should have yielded to his concept of
the “unified decisionmaking” of the executive branch. I beg to differ. JAG
opposition to harsh physical interrogation techniques was a reflection of an
analysis of the fundamental principles of human decency that underpin law
in this country, not to mention around the globe. Likewise, opposition to
an evidentiary scheme for military commissions that would have allowed
an accused to be convicted and sentenced to death based upon evidence he
never saw is not a mere “policy preference” as Yoo would have it, but rather
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insistence upon the most basic elements of due process common to every
system of jurisprudence in the free world.
These are legal interpretations, and it is wrong to trivialize them into mere
“preferences.”
In any event, Professor Yoo’s solution to the “breakdown” - as he calls it - in
civil-military relations involves creating a “principal-agent” model in which,
as I understand it, the legal advice of JAGs would have to conform with that
of the executive branch’s politically-appointed lawyers. This would create
a number of problems, including ethical ones. Our Air Force Rules of Professional Conduct, which are largely identical to the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, state that military lawyers “shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice.”25
Professor Yoo also sees the courts as a disruptive influence on civil-military
relations. Here’s the way he put it:
JAG attorneys representing enemy combatants...challenged the
legality of their clients’ detention in federal court. Military officers
with different policy preferences
sought to introduce the judiciary as
another actor to disrupt the unified
decisionmaking of the principal.26

yoo contends that the
jag opinions amounted
to no more than "policy
preferences" that should
have yielded to his concept
of "unified decisionmaking."
i beg to differ.

Amazingly, Professor Yoo is even unhappy with JAGs counseling commanders about warfighting legal issues. He
disapproves of the idea that “American
combat officers must now seek out JAGs
for rulings on the incorporation of the
law of armed conflict into their ongoing operations.”27 In fact, he rebukes
civilian leaders for allowing “a regime to arise in which the JAGs advise,
within the confines of the law, the best means of achieving military objectives.”28 In my opinion, such advising is exactly what JAGs ought to do in
the lawfare era.
What does Professor Yoo want to do about the JAGs he sees as “disruptive”?
Punish them. Indeed, he castigates the “reluctance of civilian leaders to
sanction military officers” who have, to his way of thinking, “undermined
[civilian leaders’] decisions.”29 As to the structure Professor Yoo advocates,
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in my opinion it is at odds with that our Constitution provides. That document wisely assigns civilian-control-of-the-military responsibilities not just
to the executive but to all three branches of government.
What is more is that our very strong Constitutional tradition seeks to keep
the armed forces nonpartisan. Indeed, in Greer v. Spock,30 the Supreme Court
unequivocally insisted that the military be “insulated from both the reality
and the appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan political causes.”
In the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act31 Congress acted to ensure
that commanders and senior civilian leaders would have access to independent, nonpartisan legal advice from military lawyers. That landmark piece
of legislation designated the Judge Advocate Generals as “the”32 legal advisors of their respective military departments, and their authority to render
“independent legal advice” was enshrined in law.33
Perhaps most importantly, the law now forbids anyone in the Department of
Defense not only from interfering with the rendering of independent legal
advice, but also from taking any action infringing upon the “ability” to do
so.34 It is important to emphasize that relations between military lawyers
and the vast majority of our civilian counterparts are typically warm and
professional. Still, as you may imagine, there remain a few who, like Professor Yoo, seem to fume about the role Congress has given JAGs, and seek to
diminish it – and not all of them are academics outside of government. Yet
the imperatives of today’s lawfare environment require much of JAGs. Accordingly, we continue – when necessary – to do our best to “speak truth to
power,”35 even when doing so is disquieting to those who may hear it.
Political appointees certainly have a right to put in place ideologically-driven
policies so long as doing so comports with the law. And I agree that the
proper public role of serving officers in debates about policy is currently the
subject of much-needed discussion.36 That said, should we not strive to make
determining the “law” in a given situation a politically-neutral task? In my
mind there is a real distinction between debating policy and determining the
law. Healthy civil-military relations are vital to a democracy.37 JAGs work
hard to do their duty yet not overstep the proper bounds - a rather tricky
proposition in a place like Washington where everything seems to have a
partisan dimension these days. The support – and vigilance – of the American
public is needed to ensure the appropriate balance is maintained.
Allow me to close with another plea. Today more than ever our nation needs
the synergistic efforts of the entire government, both military and civilian,
to succeed in today’s complex lawfare milieu. Let us work together – ag152 Yale Journal of International Affairs
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gressively – to maximize mutual respect in the dialogue. This is a critical
challenge for the entire national security law community. Y
-William Ko served as lead editor for this article.
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